

then that before the Court. To deny the relief sought did to leave the plaintiff anxious to which Court of justice is governed.

Verdict for the plaintiff, with reference to an adjourn to report on or at least.

**EVIDENCE OF PROOF IN AN ACTION AGAINST THE CITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.**

Philip McClellan, et al. vs. The City of New York et al.

The action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs in a work in consequence of the defendant's in not keeping a sidewalk in Princeton in the city of New York.

On the trial, which was in December, 1884, the plaintiff was walking in the crossing on a sidewalk in Prince street, and in consequence of a crust covering laid on which he had a slipped down and in turning over, fell and was injured.

The evidence in this case was in the following examination, it was shown that the defendant had laid the crust on the sidewalk, which had caused the state, was

that cause or how long before the accident did not appear. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for \$1,000.

It was held that the plaintiff was bound to show affirmatively that he had been a recipient of duty on the part of the Corporation, and that this was not shown merely by proving that the loss was insufficiently explained. The court held that the plaintiff had not shown belief from the evidence that the grate was properly constructed, or that the defendants had any care or were chargeable with knowledge of its defective state. The claim against the Corporation was not sustained, and as the plaintiff had not shown that the defendants may have been committed only a short before the plaintiff was injured. The verdict, therefore, must be sustained by the proof that the plaintiff was bound to and must be set aside. New trial granted upon payment of costs.

FORFEITURE OF MORTGAGES.

Commercial and American Building Association vs. Platt Lewis and

the mortgage was given to secure certain monthly sums stipulated to be made by the defendant as a member of the Association, and it contained a provision that if default be made "in the said monthly payments for the sum of one hundred and ten dollars a month, of which sum the sum of \$34.19 is the sum of the said monthly payments, the Association shall be lawful for the Association to advertise and sell the leased premises at public auction according to the statute." The complaint averred that default had been made in monthly payments for the sum of \$34.19 for the sum of six months of \$34.19, but did not aver that any one monthly payment had been six months. The defendant answered, on behalf of it, that it did not appear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought, and that the provision in the mortgage was not to be construed to an exercise of the power of sale by advertisement according to the statute, but that the provision was to be construed as an extension of the term of credit, so as to protect the Association from commencing any action upon the

the Building Association, Mr. James Rogers and others, who turned to complain directly on the ground that the provisions in the articles of association upon which the group was partly founded, were open to, illegal and void, and that whatever force there might be in the objections raised by the defendant would be null and void in the hands of the defendant. Rogers; and as consequently that the counter, which was to the whole complaint must be overruled. The proper course for the defendant would be to set up the proper and sufficient defenses to the complaint, and not to quarrel with the offer of the plaintiff to settle the matter agreed with by interest. The Judge referred to a similar opinion of Mr. Justice Mitchell in the case of the Second

Yonkers Building Association set, trailer and claims in the event of non-payment of the mortgage by the defendant in twenty days on payment of costs.

Mechanics Building Association, George W. Storren and others.

The mortgage in this case was also given to secure payment of the monthly dues of a member of the Association. The cause was taken on the pleadings and proofs, and it proved that the Association was duly incorporated, under several acts for the incorporation of building and other associations, passed in 1855, 1865, 1875, 1885, 1895, and 1905, and the payment of the same set forth in the complaint. The Association relied on a clause that the Association was a "mortgagee" within the provisions of the Revised Laws of the City of New York, chapter 108, section 10, of the act of the said, become void from its failure to comply with the provisions contained in sections 23, 30 and 31 of the Statute. (1 R. S. 333.) The court decided in favor of the Association, and the court shall avail themselves that, admitting that the Association

the mortgage corporation, subject as such to the provisions of the United States National Bankruptcy Act, and that the mortgage, it had furnished to the charter, it belonged to the plaintiff, and that the mortgage was not a mortgage, but a sale, by a purchaser interested for that purpose, to obtain the forfeiture and that the Association, until by a judicial decree the mortgage was declared null and void, was a corporation *de facto*, and that no private person, more especially one dealing with it, could be permitted to say that it was a corporation *de jure*. (Trille, *loc. cit.* 3 C. 118; *Palmer v. American National Bank*, 102 U. S. 104; *Palmer v. American National Bank*, 3 C. 101, 107.) Judgment for plaintiff, directing the mortgage and premises.

**STOCK-BROKERS—ESSENTIALS OF A SALE.**  
Anthony Mervin and William R. Gould, vs. Jeremiah G. Hamlin.

The complaint averred that the plaintiffs were stock-brokers, and as such had been employed by the defendant to make various purchases on his behalf. That the

well known to the defendant, that such contracts of sale are made the brokers are personally liable for their negligence, and the name of their principal is not to be inserted in the bond for the delivery of the commodity upon the maturity thereof. It then set forth various clauses of stock, deliverable on a future day, sold to by them, and employed by the defendant, and asserted that the contract of purchase of the stock was made by the defendant at or before its maturity, not upon a delivery of the stock, but pay the price agreed to be paid thereafter, not including the plaintiffs' agency, and that the plaintiffs were compelled to accept a delivery of the stock and to pay the price agreed to be paid thereafter, their liability exceeding the worth of the stock at the time of the purchase, whereupon the plaintiffs were forced to close out the stock at a loss, and after setting forth four distinct contracts of purchase, as distinct causes of action, averred that the stocks so purchased had been sold by the plaintiffs at the best price obtainable at the time of the sale, and that the worth of the stock was less than the maturity of the several

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As was their legal obligation, was plainly sufficient. It was an avowal of a conclusion of law instead of the facts necessary to be ascertained and proved. The plaintiff was therefore fatally defective in writing the contract made by the plaintiffs were in selling and selling forth their terms. Unless the contracts were in writing, there was no contract. The contract was therefore one of the facts constituting the cause of action. *See* *Staples v. Dyer*, 60, *Lo. Rep.* 341, *Shaw*, 51.

And further, that upon the supposition that the contracts made by the plaintiff were valid, the stocks when accepted and delivered by them, belonged in equity to the defendants, and they were entitled to sell them, having the right to sell them at the time and to whom they pleased. The plaintiffs had therefore no right to sell the stock in any way nor under any a tender they had the defendant an opportunity to redeem them, and they were entitled to sell them at any price and to whom they pleased and on terms of the sale. No such tender or notice whatever was

to be in complaint.  
number allowed. Twenty days allowed to amend com-  
plaint, upon payment of cost.

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT—JUNE 3.—Before  
JACKSON.**

**FUGITIVE WILSON AND OTHERS INDICTED.**

The Grand Jury brought in two new bills this morning, a second indictment against Ellen Coughlin and Mary, for passing counterfeit half dollars; in the second in-  
dictment, added as the United States Court, and so indicted  
as the United States Court, for making a revolt on board  
ships and inciting and warring the compound.

**FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE.**

The Hamilton Building Association set John M. Reynolds  
the cause was heard upon pleadings and proofs, and  
was on the part of the plaintiff, the estate in the com-  
plaint, and was on the part of the defend-

[illegible][illegible]

that the defendant must be understood that the objection in jurisdiction of the Judge by which the debtor was excluded from the order appointing a receiver, was made, and that the debtor was not present before him; that it was an error which it was competent to the debtor to waive, and by his submitting to be examined and not appealing from the order appointing the receiver, he waived the error, and by not appealing the order of his appearance was a fault, he is not bound to appear, nor, when he appeared, to be examined, that his appearance and submission to an examination and not appealing from the order, was a fault, and that, therefore, he is regarded as voluntarily submitting to the order of the court, and that the receiver might be founded upon ordinary appearance and examination of a judgment debtor, and it is not reasonably to be denied; that if only when a judge of the court has jurisdiction of the case, and the receiver is appointed, and the order is made or judgment rendered, and that the receiver judgment is wholly void. It is to such cases that the maxim applies, that consent cannot give jurisdiction.

jurisdiction. It is stated that, "wherever the jurisdiction may be waived, and it is waived whenever it is not in proper posture, and that, when the exercise of the jurisdiction is first claimed" (Carpath, 124; Cro. Eas., 562; 117; 284; 4 C. Rep., 606). Here the asserted exercise of the power to make the order appointing a receiver in *in rem* was the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case.

It is further stated that "if the objection to the jurisdiction were made by the party himself, it would not be taken under a doctrine of estoppel, but only ground that the complaint 'did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' The ground is stated to have been specified to enable the Court to issue the